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WHY GENERICS FAILED IN THE UK: LESSONS FOR LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
ABSTRACT 
Generics, through their low prices, should be attractive to low income consumers and less 
developed countries, but if incorrectly positioned can damage retailers’ profitability and 
image. Drawing on the UK experience of generics, lessons for their marketing in less 
developed countries are noted. The positioning strategy for generics is questioned and the 
initial attraction for retailers and consumers considered. From a sample of 829 householders, 
cluster analysis showed that generics were perceived as similar to own labels. The 
consequential withdrawal of “neo-generics” is considered and the revised launch of true 
generics by smaller multiple retailers is described. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1976 Carrefour in France pioneered an alternative competitive tier to brands and own 
labels, which gave consumers the choice of buying acceptable quality groceries without the 
surcharge of promotional or excessive packaging frill (Hawes, 1982). The advent of generics 
soon became apparent throughout the developed world (Fitzell, 1982) with retail sales of 
generics in the USA in 1984 exceeding $2.5 billion or approximately 2% of supermarket sales 
(Harris and Strang, 1985). Yet while generics are in the maturity stage of the product life 
cycle in the USA, they quickly passed into the decline stage in the UK. Ironically a new 
competitive tier had been developed which would enable low income consumers achieve 
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more with their limited budget, however in the UK in 1984, when 12.5% of the working 
population were unemployed (Advertising Association, 1986). International became the first 
retailer to withdraw from generics and by January 1987 none of the multiple retailers 
stocked generics. This paper is concerned with understanding why UK retailers withdrew 
their generics and considers how this experience might help retailers develop generics in less 
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developed countries. 
The first part of this paper develops an argument proposing that generics in the UK did not 
represent a unique tier, but were instead an extension of the own label concept. Stocking 
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generics might harm the retailer’s image and some of the reasons for and against generics are 
presented. The low price of generics may benefit the consumer faced with a limited 
household budget (albeit this is shown not to be the main buying group), however if the 
positioning of generics is too close to own labels, this would encourage own label purchasers 
to switch from a more profitable to a less profitable range. The research design to assess 
consumers’ perceptions of the competitive tiers is described and from the conclusion that 
generics are perceived as being an extension of own labels, the implications of this 
positioning are considered as experience to guide the marketing of generics in less developed 
countries. 
GENERICS AS A REAL ALTERNATIVE? 
While Carrefour are credited with challenging the conventional brands and own labels tiers 
(Faria, 1979), Carson (1976) was one of the first authors to question whether this represented 
a new approach to own labels, rather than being an innovative third tier. During 1975 in 
France, own labels only accounted for 75% of packaged grocery sales (Sheath and 
McGoldrick, 1981), compared with 21% in the UK (Simmons and Meredith, 1983). 
Furthermore as Davies et al (1985) reported, French consumers were confused by product 
prices, due to the proliferation of price promotions, and they desired simpler, informative 
labelling. Within this context Carrefour launched “Produits Libre”, positioned to match the 
quality of brands, packaged in white packs with the tricolour CF logo, supported by f3m 
advertising and priced lo-30% lower than brands. In my opinion, these characteristics come 
closer to describing an extension of the own label concept and not true generics. 
The term generic implies retailer controlled items which are packed in such a way that the 
prime concern with the packaging is product protection, with minimal concern for aesthetic 
appeal and displaying only the legal minimum amount of information. Without careful 
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reading, the generics from one grocery retailer would be virtually indistinguishable from 
those of another grocery retailer. No promotional support would be given to generics and in 
view of the cost savings on packaging and promotion, they should be cheaper than own 
labels. 
Yet in the UK, while they were referred to as generics, the generic concept was not widely 
enacted by the major multiple retailers who entered the arena (excepting Fine Fare’s trial of 
Pack Your Own). The reality was that eye-catching, multicolour packaging was used, with 
one retailer even branding their “generics” (BASICS from Argyll). Each retailer adopted a 
corporate pack design further emphasising the association of specific generics with certain 
retailers. Promotional packs appeared (eg: BASICS aluminium foil flashed “10% extra free”) 
along with a small amount of advertising support (McGoldrick, 1984). The once Marketing 
Director of Fine Fare (Allan, 1981) even went as far as saying: 
“Incidentally I deliberately said brands for two reasons. First of all we have more than 
one brand, Yellow Pack as well as Fine Fare Brand. Secondly, we see both of these 
product ranges as Brands adding value to the shopping experience Fine Fare customers 
get at Fine Fare.” (p 9) 
It would appear that “neo-generics” (following Hawes and McEnally’s (1983) terminology) 
had been introduced into the UK, since this new tier had, from a marketing perspective, 
more in common with the own label concept. Likewise in the USA, retailers were aware of 
the potential damage that poor quality generics might have on their image and the 
metamorphosis into neo-generics occurred with some retailers branding their generics (Kono, 
1985). These lower cost groceries may be attractive to some groups trying to stretch their 
household budget, but their down market image may weaken retailers’ images. It is, 
therefore, illuminating to consider why retailers started to offer this range. 
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WHY WERE GENERICS INTRODUCED? 
From the retailer’s perspective there were several reasons for launching generics. Some 
regarded this new range as adding value to the stores total mix, of creating a new image, 
increasing their share of labels under their control and enabling a more price competitive 
position to be adopted. Other retailers were less keen on this concept, fearing it might 
damage their image (Simmons and Meredith, 1983), and worrying that total shelf space 
profitability may fall with these lower margin items (Harris and Strang, 1985). 
The consumer benefit that retailers were striving to satisfy with generics was good value for 
money. A Nielsen survey (1982) showed that on average generics in the UK were 40%~ 
cheaper than the brand leader and 20% lower than the equivalent own label. Lower prices 
were an attractive feature to consumers, with Gardner (1982) and McGoldrick (1984) 
reporting price as the main reason for consumers buying generics, albeit there is evidence of 
poor consumer awareness of grocery prices (McGoldrick and Marks, 1986). Yet these lower 
prices were not obtained primarily from the plainer packaging (Euromonitor, 1986). Instead 
a combination of factors lead to the lower prices, ie reduced product quality, accepting 
lower margins, more flexible approach to product sourcing, minimal promotional activity, 
one pack size only and more skilful negotiation (Shircore, 1983; Burck, 1979; Murphy and 
Laczniak, 1979; McEnally, 1980). 
WERE LESS AFFLUENT CONSUMERS BUYING GENERICS? 
When considering the profile of the generic purchaser, previous surveys have presented 
contradictory data (Yucelt, 1987). Murphy and Laczniak (1979) found no difference 
between the generic and non-generic buyer in terms of income, Strang et al (1979) and 
Zbytniewski and Heller (1979) reported them to belong to middle income zrouDs while 
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Wilkes and Valencia (1985) found generic purchasers having lower incomes. Different 
methodologies impede comparison, however in view of low income purchasers taking a 
greater financial risk when buying unknown generics, it is thought more likely that low 
income consumers were reticent in trying this new tier. The lack of any “guarantee” through 
branding (Morris, 1979) may conceivably have initially deterred low income consumers. 
While there are difficulties obtaining a view on the profile of the generic purchaser, clearly 
such a range of groceries should be of economic significance to low income groups. But 
while retailers stocking generics may feel there are benefits to these groups (as well as to 
themselves), they would need to balance these benefits against their cost (particularly the 
impact of generics on the retailer’s image and the rest of the product range). If, as the early 
part of this paper explained, the positioning of generics was too close to own labels, then 
this perceptual similarity may have detrimental consequences for multiple retailers stocking 
generics. As perception is a mediating variable influencing purchasing decisions (Engel et 
al, 1986), the way consumers perceive the competitive structure of grocery markets was 
investigated. Specifically the following hypothesis was to be tested: 
HI: People do not perceive the competitive structure of grocery markets in the same 
manner as marketers (ie: pure brands vs pure own labels vs pure generics). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To provide a good test of this hypothesis, six product fields were sought which each had to 
have a minimum of three branded, three own label at at least two (preferably three) 
generics. The product fields selected were aluminium foil, bleach, household disinfectant, 
kitchen towels, toilet paper and washing up liquid. 
To evaluate respondents’ perceptions, image-attribute batteries were developed specifically 
for each product field and respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with 
each statement describing each of the items on display in their product field. To obtain 
consumer relevant attributes Kelly Grid tests (Fransella and Bannister, 1977) were used in 
conjunction with other statements derived from advertisement claims. For each product 
field, approximately 15 householders in the North London area were interviewed (95 
interviews in total). In excess of 80 statements resulted for each product field and a further 
exercise was undertaken to reduce these to more acceptable lengths. 
Within each product field, approximately 25 statements were frequently observed. These 
statements were viewed as being important evaluative attributes, but it was thought that 
there might still be some repetition between these statements. Inspection of the correlations 
between attributes, in conjunction with principal component analysis (Jolliffe, 1973) is an 
ideal way of reducing the number of attributes. Consequently six image-attribute batteries 
were produced and for each product field 15 different householders were asked to state how 
much they agreed or disagreed (five point scale) with each statement describing each of the 
items on display (91 further interviews). Undertaking this analysis for each product field 
resulted in eight to ten statements adequately portraying the majority of the information. 
Thus image-attribute batteries of a size unlikely to cause respondent fatigue and yet 
incorporating those attributes important to respondents had been developed to measure 
perception of market structure. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Questionnaires were designed and piloted for the six product fields. Using a systematic 
sampling procedure 2,196 householders in Hertford (population approximately 20,000) were 
selected using the February 1985 Electoral Register. To reflect buying behaviour, preference 
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was given to selecting the female in the household. One of the six questionnaires was sent to 
each person along with a 16 cm x 10 cm colour photograph showing the eight or nine 
competitive offerings relevant to the specific questionnaire. A covering letter explaining the 
purpose of the study was enclosed as was a Business Reply Paid envelope. Each envelope 
was handwritten and a handwritten salutation used on each covering letter, which was 
personally signed. A second class stamp was stuck to each envelope. 
Questionnaires were mailed during August and received during September 1985. With the 
use of a reminder letter 1,065 questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 48%. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Attention was focused on those 829 respondents who had correctly completed the appropriate 
image-attribute battery. Several ways exist to assess how people perceptually group items 
into categories which exhibit internal cohesion, eg cluster analysis, Q-type principal 
component analysis, multi-dimensional scaling and discriminant analysis (Everitt, 1986). 
Cluster analysis appeared most appropriate for this research and to observe the order in 
which clusters had evolved, a hierarchical agglomerative method was selected. Recognising 
that the clustering algorithm selected defines what is meant by a cluster (Cormack, 1971) it 
was decied to use the single link algorithm. 
Respondents’ agreement-disagreement batteries within each product field were first 
standardised and each converted to a squared Euclidean distance matrix. For each market 
the mean standardised squared Euclidean distance matrix was calculated which was then 
subjected to single link cluster analysis using the CLUSTAN computer package (Wishart, 
1978). The results of the cluster analysis were displayed on a dendrogram. This is a 
hierarchical clustering tree which shows, for example, at the bottom of the tree there are 
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nine unclustered items, at the next level moving up the tree there are seven unclustered 
items with two items forming a shared cluster, etc. By examing each level of the 
dendrogram the way that clusters evolved could be seen. 
CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
Inspection of table one shows how respondents perceived the competitive structure of each 
product field at the three cluster level. Only in the washing up liquid sector do respondents 
perceive the market as pure brands versus pure own labels versus pure generics. At the 
three cluster level the brands never merged with the own labels in any product field and it is 
interesting to see the start of the own labels and generics merging. At the two cluster level, 
clear evidence exists of consumers’ perceiving generics and own labels as being similar. In 
all six product fields, the generics were always seen to be similar to the own labels. 
PRODUCTFIELD SAMPLE 3 CLUSTER 
SIZE COMPOSITION 
Aluminium Foil 135 (3B) (20L) (1OL + 3G) 
Bleach 148 (3B) (30L + 1G) (IG) 
Disinfectant 143 (3B) (30L + IG) (1G) 
Kitchen Towels 130 (2B) (1B) (30L + 3G) 
Toilet Paper 129 (3B) (20L + 3G) (IOL) 
Washing Up Liquid 144 (3B) (30L) (3G) 
B = Brand, OL = Own Label, G = Generic 
2 CLUSTER 
COMPOSITION 
(3B) (30L + 3G) 
(3B) (30L + 2G) 
(3B) (30L + 2G) 
(3B) (30L + 3G) 
(3B) (30L + 3G) 
(3B) (30L + 3G) 
Table 1: Perceived Market Structure 
The findings at the two tier level are similar to those in the USA of Hawes and McEnally 
(1983) and Wilkes and Valencia (1985). 
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RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF RESULTS 
The reliability of results was tested by randomly dividing the samples in each of the six 
markets into two halves and seeing whether similar results occur in each half (Everitt, 1979). 
Visual examination of each pair of dendrograms showed that at the three cluster level, four 
of the product fields maintained a consistent structure across the random pairs, while at the 
two cluster level, five of the product fields showed similar structure pairs. Furthermore 
within each product field the cophenetic correlation coefficient (Sokal and Sneath, 1963) 
between the random half sample pairs never fell below 0.94. It is therefore concluded that 
the perceptions were reliably measured. 
Construct validity was assessed by applying complete link, average link and minimum 
variance clustering algorithms to the six product fields. In only the kitchen towels and 
disinfectant samples do the single link results go against the other three algorithms, but even 
then at the two cluster level there is perfect agreement. It is therefore believed that the 
single link method had construct validity. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
These results show that because of the way retailers in the UK virtually “branded” their 
generics, consumers saw considerable similarity between generics and own labels. As the 
neo-generic, rather than the generic concept, was enacted in the UK, respondents 
categorised own labels and generics as similar. One consequence of this perc;ption is that 
consumers are more likely to switch from own labels, rather than brands, to generics. As 
generics partially achieved their low prices through low margins (Shircore, 1983) and as own 
labels are more profitable than brands (Euromonitor, 1986), this had an impact upon 
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retailers’ profitability. This was believed to be one of the contributory factors leading to the 
poor profit levels achieved by International after the launch of their generic range. 
Another potentially damaging effect from the perceived similarity of own labels and generics 
is their down market image. Some UK retailers, eg Tesco, have been using their own labels 
as a means of shifting their image up market (Bond, 1985), yet the perceived similarity 
between own labels and generics would have hindered such positioning strategies. 
Supporting this view, Jacoby and Mazursky (1984) showed that there was an interaction 
effect between a retailer’s image and the image of the “brands” stocked; the party with the 
more favourable image was found to be adversely affected. This may explain why Tesco 
eventually restricted their original generic range to the Limited Line Discount Store they 
once owned (Victor Value) and why they finally withdrew from the generics arena. 
Thus in the UK this research indicates that one of the reasons for retailers withdrawing 
from generics was because they had positioned them too close to their own labels. Ironically 
the reassurance consumers obtained from the retailers branding of generics, worked contrary 
to retailers long term objectives. 
The generic concept has an appeal to the less affluent purchaser and within the UK the true 
generic concept has been revived. This approach in the UK was pioneered by Fine Fare 
(now part of Gateway) with its Pack Your Own range. Shoppers are able to go along to bins 
of produce, select the quantity they want by weighing and packing the item themselves. 
Gateway have been expanding their Pack Your Own department (The Grocer, 1987a) and 
several smaller multiple retailers dedicated to selling only true generics (eg: Food Factory, 
Weigh and Save, Pick n’ Pack) have started to thrive in the UK (The Grocer, 1987b). 
For less developed countries, the UK experience with neo-generics provides certain lessons. 
In terms of benefits to the local population, generics offer a lower cost alternative to 
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competing tiers. Retailers considering adopting a generic range should be aware of the 
importance of consumer perceptions and recognise the implication these may have on both 
short and long term objectives. Some degree of reassurance will be sought by consumers 
considering the purchase of generics, however, this should not be acheived through a 
positioning strategy likely to affect the profitability and image objectives of the retailer. 
Instead reassurance should come from aspects such as cues within the store indicating high 
levels of hygiene and supportive work of mouth from innovators and early adopters. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research has shown the importance of marketers properly understanding consumers’ 
perceptions of the competitive tiers. The neo-generic concept failed in the UK because it 
was positioned too close to the current range of own labels. Retailers adopting a generic 
range in less developed countries need to ensure that the positioning strategy of their 
generics is sufficiently thought through and consumer research undertaken to assess 
consumers’ perceptions. Researchers are exhorted to consider how other developed nations 
(eg USA) have fared with generics and consider what else could be learned to enhance the 
standard of living in less developed countries through better marketing of generics. 
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